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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ZOLA M. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 7411

ELMER W. SMITH,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal from a decree entered September 14,
1949, by Honorable Roald A. Hogenson of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, adjudging the
defendant in contempt of court and sentencing him to 30 days
in the Salt Lake County jail (R. 133).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
· Zola M. Smith, the plaintiff, was divorced from the defendant by a decree entered in 1941, in which decree the
defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $50.00 per month
3
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"as alimony and for support" of the four minor children of
the parties (R. 12). Plaintiff remarried in 1943 and left the
State of Utah with the four children, eventually establishing
her residence in San Bernardino, California. During the years
between 1941 and the date of the contempt proceedings in
1949, plaintiff attempted to realize upon the provisions of the
decree as to alimony and support money, and the record shows
a number of Orders to Show Cause, Garnishments and Commitments, most of which are not material to the consideration
of this appeal.
On February 3, 1949, plaintiff, through her counsel in
Salt Lake City, filed an order for the defendant to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt (R. 99), hearing
being set for February 9th. Plaintiff appeared by her counsel
and defendant appeared in person and by counsel. During
this hearing the parties entered into a stipulation that if
the defendant and a third person would give a bill of sale
to the fixtures and equipment in a certain restaurant, transfer
the lease, and warrant and defend the title to the fixtures
and equipment, plaintiff would give to defendant a satisfaction of judgment. On this same day the following order
was entered by Hon. Clarence E. Baker:
"The plaintiff's order to show cause comes now on
for hearing before the Court, the plaintiff appearing
by and through her counsel, LaMar Duncan, the defendant being present and being represented by his
counsel, E. LeRoy Shields and Jed Shields. Whereupon
Elmer W. Smith is sworn and testifies in his own behalf.
Comes now the defendant and Lilly Parry Smith, a
third party, and executes and delivers to the plaintiff
a bill of sale for the fixtures and equipment and the

4
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lease at 421 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
in full satisfaction of the judgment for alimony and
support money in favor of the plaintiff, and against
the defendant. Comes now the plaintiff and moves the
Court to dismiss the plaintiff's order to show cause and
the Court being fully advised in the premises, orders
the plaintiff's order to show cause dismissed." (R.102)
(Italics added.)
Immediately thereafter, defendant paid-off his attorneys,
withdrew some funds he had in an assumed name in a local
bank, and left the State of Utah.
On February 19th, LaMar S. Duncan, attorney for plaintiff, served upon defendant's counsel a notice of intention to
move to have the stipulation and order set aside (R. 106).
Mr. Duncan appeared before Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson on
February 25th, and moved that the hearing on this motion
be continued until March 1st; in response to this second
motion, the court ordered:
"Upon motion of counsel for the plaintiff and good
cause appearing therefor, it is hereby ordered plaintiff's motion to set aside be, and the same is continued
to March 1, 1949 at ten o'clock A.M. on the condition
that plaintiff serves notice upon the defendant not later
than February 26, 1949." (Italics added.)
In the meantime (February 24th) Shields and Shields
had served upon plaintiff's counsel a notice (R. 109) that
they had withdrawn as attorneys for defendant. Notwithstanding this notice, plaintiff's counsel served upon Shields
and Shields a notice that the continued hearing would be
held on March 1. This notice was served on February 25th,
the day after notice of withdrawal had been served upon Mr.
Duncan (R. 110).

5
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The motion to set aside was heard ex parte and Hon.
Clarence E. Baker granted an order as requested (R. 112).
A decree setting aside the stipulation a-nd reinstating the
judgment "except as actually satisfied" was signe~ by Judge
Baker on March 7th.
During this time the defendant had been in the State
of Nevada and did not know of the proceedings. He returned
to Utah in August (T. 156) and on September 9th was served
with an order to show cause why he should not be committed
for contempt of court for failure to pay alimony and support
money (R. 124, 125). On defendant's failure to appear, a
bench warrant was issued and defendant brought into court
on September 12 (R. 126). Hearing on the order to show
cause was held on September 13, defendant appearing in
person and by counsel, and plaintiff appearing by counsel
(R. 128).
The hearing was held before the Hon. Roald A. Hogenson,
the defendant being the only witness sworn. He, on direct
examination by plaintiff's counsel, testified that he had withdrawn approximately $1700 from the Walker Bank & Trust
Company shortly after the Stipulatoin and Order of February 9th (R. 151). Then the following exchange took place:
"Q. Would it be February of 1949?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It was a few days after you were in court?
MR. SHIELDS: May I make this observation, and
make· this objection: when we were in Court that day,
Mr. Duncan, a settlement was made of this matter
completely, for all back and future support money and
alimony.

6
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THE COURT: For future alimony?
MR. DUNCAN: It wasn't future.
THE COURT: I wouldn't pay any attention to
future alimony.
MR. SHIELDS: Everything was settled up that
day in court, and a stipulation signed by the parties.
THE COURT: The parties didn't agree to settle
the support money, not the future support money for
minor children." ( T. 151) .
It appeared that the defendant had used the money so
withdrawn to live on, and to pay off some checks which were
outstanding (T. 153-155), and that during the time he was
in Nevada he earned only $50.00 (T. 149).

There was no testimony by or for the plaintiff, all of
her evidence coming from the affidavit in support of the order
to show cause (R. 119). There was nothing in the affidavit
to show that after March 1, 1949, the defendant had any
money, or that he had received a notice of the order to pay
alimony, or that any demand had been made upon him for
alimony and support money payments.
Following the conclusion of defendant's testimony, the
court made the following statement:
"I don't believe the testimony. He said he has only
made $50.00 since February, 1949. I simply don't
believe it. I believe he has made more, and substantially more. In any event, he had in his possession
on the 16th day of February, 1949, $1700.00 out of
which he paid $208.43 for existing obligations which,
of course, he had to pay. The balance of approximately
$1500.0Q-a few dollars less than $1500.00, he testified he used to live on. He testified he has paid nothing
7
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on the decree of this court, in pursuance of the decree
of this Court since that time for the support of the
* * *"
minor children, as ordered in the case.
(T. 170).
The next paragraph of the court's statement (T. 170)
shows that the court looked at the entire record to fix the
sentence for contempt, and that the court fixed the penalty
at the maximum allowed by law.
On September 14, 1949, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law were filed (R. 131, 132), which will be reprinted
hereinafter. Additional facts will appear in the argument.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. The court erred in refusing to hear any evidence as
to the effect of the Order of February 9, 1949, on future alimony
and support money payments.

2. The court erred in finding that the defendant willfully refused to pay the money ordered by the court.

3. From the findings of fact made, the court erred in
concluding that the defendant was in contempt of court.
4. The court erred in looking at the entire record to
determine the amount of punishment to impose upon the
defendant.
POINTS
1. The order of February 9, 1949, should be construed

to satisfy the judgment of plaintiff for all alimony and support money, due or to become due, from the defendant.
8
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2. An order made after notice and hearing may not be

set aside ex parte, and an attempt by the court so to do is void,
of no effect, and subject to attack at any time.
3. Notice to a withdrawn attorney of record is not notice
to that attorney's former client.
4. Where an order, or combination of orders, is so ambiguous that it cannot reasonably be determined therefrom
what is required to be done, such order, or combination, should
not be the foundation of a contempt proceeding.
5. Where a new order is entered, directing a party to do
something he was not theretofore bound to do, or clarifying an
order that was theretofore ambiguous, the party against whom
the order is directed is entitled to notice of the new order
before he can be found in contempt of court for failure to
obey it.
6. Notice or knowledge by the defendant of what is
required of him must appear either in the proofs taken at the
hearing or in the affidavit supporting the citation and order
to show cause.
7. In order to support the conclusion that the defendant

is in contempt of court, the court must find that the defendant
knew of the order to pay money, that he refused, and that he
had ability to pay during the period of time in which he possessed the knowledge of his duty.
8. Civil contempt proceedings are for the purpose of

enforcing an order of the court, not for imposing a penalty for
past disobedience.

9
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ARGUMENT

I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR ANY
EVIDENCE AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE ORDER OF
FEBRUARY 9, 1949, ON FUTURE ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY.

II

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WILLFULLY REFUSED TO PAY THE MONEY ORDERED BY THE COURT.

1. The order of February 9, 1949, should be construed
to satisfy the judgment of plaintiff for all alimony and support
money, due or to become due, from the defendant.
As appears in the Statement of Facts, the order entered
by Hon. Clarence E. Baker on February 9th incorporated the
stipulation that in consideration of the transfer of certain
restaurant property to the plaintiff there was a "full satisfaction of the judgment for alimony and support money in favor
of the plaintiff, and against the defendant" (R. 102).
When the parties entered into this stipulation, it was the
agreement that the entire claim of the plaintiff would be satisfied and that the proceedings would be terminated. The stipulation was the result of an attempt by the parties to close
the long file involved in the case. And although the stipulation
does not appear in the record, its intent and meaning is re10
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fleeted in the proceedings and in the order of the court entered
on the basis of the stipulation.
There was a judgment and decree for alimony and support money entered against the defendant in 1941. In 1948
the past-due portion had reduced to a new judgment. Defendant came in on February 9, 1949, on an order to show cause
why he should not be committed for contempt for failure to
pay alimony and support money to the plaintiff. The order
subsequently issued by the court, by its terms, satisfies the
judgment for all alimony and support money. And "judgment"
is a broad term in the code states. It includes decrees in equity
and divorce proceedings as well as judgments at law. As is
said in 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, §4:
"In the states which have adopted the Code procedure,
however, * * * relief in all actions, whether of
a legal or equitable character, is obtained by a judgment in a civil action of the code."
And see Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §464 (a) to the same
effect. Also, 23 Words and Phrases 166, et seq. The code
definition of "judgment" is a very real factor to consider in
arriving at the intent of the parties in making the stipulation,
and the intent of the court in incorporating it into its order.
To hold that this stipulation and order satisfied only that
portion of the judgment that was past due, or "reduced to
judgment'' is to disregard its plain words.
It should also be noted that counsel for plaintiff was quick
to procure the court to set aside this order and stipulation and
order before taking steps to have the defendant placed in
contempt of court.
11
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2. An order made after notice and hearing may not be
set aside ex parte, and an attempt by the court so to do is void,
of no effect, and subject to attack at any time.

While it is true that a stipulation may be, in the proper
case, set aside by the court ex parte and without notice, and
that the same may be done with certain orders of the court, there
are types of orders which may be set aside only after notice to
the adverse party. This statement of principle was recognized and asserted by this Court in Cox v. Dixie Power Company, 81 Utah 94, 16 P. 2d 916, at 921:
"Where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and of the
parties, there are undoubtedly various orders which the
court can make without notice to the adverse party and
be of binding effect, in the absence of a motion or
notice to vacate or modify the order. But such doctrine
applies only to such orders as the court has power
to make without notice. It does not apply to a purported ex parte order whose effect is to deprive a party
of property without due process of law or which constitutes a final order affecting substantial rights from
which an appeal lies. * * * A motion is ordinarily confined to incidental matters in the progress of
the case." (Italics added.)
In the present case the Order of March 1st, setting aside
the stipulation and order of February 9th, was such an order
as would require notice under the language of the quoted
opinion. By setting aside the order and stipulation, the Court
deprived the defendant of valuable property ( and eventually
liberty) without notice. This appears more conclusive when it
is observed that the March 1st order set aside the stipulation,
yet allowed the plaintiff to retain the property she had acquired
12
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by virtue of the stipulation-from the defendant and a third
party against whom the original decree did not run. If the
court was to set aside the stipulation, it was imperative that
it set the entire transaction aside. It was unjust and error to
allow the plaintiff to retain the benefits of the stipulation while
suffering no detriment in return.
Two sections of the Utah statutes require notice of motions
and orders. Section 104-42-6 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads:
"An order made out of court without notice to the adverse party may be vacated and modified without notice
by the judge who made it, or may be vacated and modified on notice.''
This section is precise as to what may be done without notice.
Negative implication requires the construction that in other
cases notice must be given.
Together with the above, we must read 104-14-4, which
governs, generally, the setting aside of orders:

" * * *

The Court may likewise, in its discretion,
after notice to the adverse party, allow upon such terms
as may be just an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms
allow an answer, reply or motion for new trial to be
made and filed after the time limited by this code; and
may also, upon such terms as be just, relieve a party or
his legal representatives from a judgment, order or
other proceeding taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertance, surprise or excpsable neglect."
This provision requires notice as a prerequisite to setting
aside an order which was entered with notice and hearing.
Such a construction is a logical one. It has been followed by

13
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the California Court of Appeal. California Code of .Civil
Procedure § 473 is substantially the same as our 104-14-4.
This section 473 came before the California court in Moran v.
Superior Court in and for Sacramento County, 35 Cal. App. 2d
629, 96 P. 2d 193.

The Moran case was one in which the defendant after
notice and hearing had procured the court to make an order
setting aside an interlocutory decree of divorce. The trial court
later decided that it had erred in setting aside the decree and
on its own motion and without notice set the prior order aside
and reinstated the decree. The Court of Appeal agreed that
the trial court had erred in setting aside the decree in the
first instance; but it went on to hold that the second orderreinstating the decree-was void because it had been made
without notice to the defendant. Said the court:
"In determining the question as to whether an order
of this character is valid or void, the same test should
be applied .as where a judgment is subjected to the
inquiry. 42 C.J. 5·57, § 272.
* * *
The order made pursuant to the notice of motion was
therefore not void on its face, and the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in vacating such order on its
own motion."
(Italics added.)
The general rule, as laid down in 60 C.J.S., Motions and
Orders, § 62 ( 5), p. 75-, is as follows:
"A party who may be interested in resisting the motion
may be entitled to notice of motion to amend, modify,
or vacate an order, and especially so when the order
sought to be amended, modified, or vacated is an order
that was itself settled, made and entered on notice."

14
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If the order setting aside the stipulation and order of
February 9th was void, defendant could properly disregard it
and attack the validity of the second order at any time. As the
California Supreme Court said in Smith v. Los Angeles and
P.R. Co., 34 Pac. 242, 4 Cal. Unrep. Cs. 237:
"This is not a direct attack upon the order appointing
the receiver, but the order being void, it may be disregarded. If the order is absolutely void, it is a nullity,
and can be attacked in any proceeding."
On the final hearing of the order to show cause, which
led directly to the sentencing of defendant for contempt, and
hence to this appeal, counsel for defendant objected to interrogation of the defendant as to his earnings on the ground that
the judgment of the plaintiff had been satisfied and that there
was nothing before the court. If satisfaction were established,
there would be nothing of which defendant could be in contempt. But the trial court refused to consider the question of
satisfaction and proceeded with the hearing. To preserve the
record, defendant was not obligated to make an offer of proof
on the point for two reasons: ( 1) the burden was on the
plaintiff to establish that there was a subsisting order of which
the defendant was in contempt, and (2) the court's pointblank refusal to hear anything concerning the effect of the
stipulation on future alimony and support money would have
obviated .the necessity of an offer of proof, even if the satisfaction had been an element of defense-for defendant would
not have been obligated to make a futile offer merely for the
sake of form when the court had indicated what its ruling
would be. Hereinafter we will point out how this refusal of
the court to inquire into the terms of the satisfaction was

15
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prejudicial error even if the stipulation and order was not subsisting.
3. Notice to a withdrawn attorney of record is not notice
to that attorney's former client.

We have attempted to point out the law as to requirements of notice of motions and orders. If it be argued tha't
there was notice to the defendant, through his counsel, it need
only be shown that the defendant's counsel had been released
by the defendant prior to the service of the notice, and were
no longer authorized to act for him nor to appear for him.
Shields and Shields had been released as counsel for the
defendant on February 9th, or a few days thereafter. On
February 19th, plaintiff's attorney, LaMar S. Duncan, served
on them a notice that he would move, on February 25th, to
have the order and stipulation set aside. Later plaintiff obtained
a continuance to March 1st, the order granting the continuance
being "on condition" that the defendant be notified not later
than February 26th. Prior to plaintiff's service of a notice of continuance,
Shields and Shields served upon plaintiff's counsel, and filed
with the court, a notice that they had withdrawn, and that they
no longer represented the defendant. The day after receiving
this notice of withdrawal, viz., on February 25th, plaintiff's
counsel served upon Shields and Shields_ a notice of the continued hearing. _
The notice thus served complied neither with the general
law as to notices of motion, nor to the express order of the
court below. The cmut, in acting on the motion to set aside
16
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the stipulation and order, was obligated to ascertain whether
proper notice had been given. And the record before it showed
that it had not.
Whether service on a discharged attorney is service on a
party has been decided by this Court. In Sandall v. Sandall,
57 Utah 150, 193 Pac. 1093, 15 A.L.R. 620, the plaintiff sought
to modify a decree nine years after it had been entered. Notice
of motion to modify was served on the attroneys who were then
attorneys of record, having represented the defendant in the
original action. Apparently no withdrawal as attorney was ever
entered. But the court held that the service of the notice was
not sufficient to bind the defendant, and said:
"The authorities support the proposition that an attorney's relation to his client ceases upon the rendition
of judgment and satisfaction thereof, unless there are
disturbing events or a special arrangement continuing
the relation. The following excerpt from 6 C. J., p.
672, Sec. 184, illustrates the trend of authority:
'In the absence of disturbing events the employment of
an attorney continues as long as the suit or business
upon which he is engaged is pending, and ordinarily
comes to an end with the completion of the special
task for which the attorney was employed. Where the
evidence of continuance of the relation is conflicting,
it is a question for the jury.
'It is always a presumption that an attorney is employed
to conduct the litigation to judgment, and no farther;
the relation of attorney and client and the general
powers of attorney cease upon the rendition and entering of the judgment. There is a distinction between
those cases where the attorney is retained to represent
the plaintiff, and those in which he represents the defendant; in the latter case, the entry of final judgment
17
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always terminates the relation and the attorney's authority; in the former case it is generally the rule that the
attorney's authority lasts until satisfaction of the judgment, and that he may take the ordinary and usual
steps to secure such satisfaction.' "
In the present case, in addition to the circumstance that
the litigation for which the attorneys for defendant were employed had ended, there was the factor that notice of this fact
had been given to plaintiff, and that the withdrawal of attorneys was made a matter of record. This being so, plaintiff's
counsel could not give notice to the withdrawn attorneys and
have it suffice to constitute notice to the defendant.
From the foregoing arguments it appears that there was
no notice of motion given to the defendant, and that the court
exceeded its jurisdiction in going ahead ex parte in deciding
a matter of such consequence. And inasmuch as the stipulation
and order invalidly set aside settled all judgments in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant, there was nothing
before the court for which the defendant could be committed
for contempt.
4. Where an order, or combination of orders, is so ambiguous that it cannot be reasonably determined therefrom
what is required to be done, such order, or combination, should
not be the foundation of a contempt proceeding.

Assuming, but not conceding, that the order and stipulation of February 9th can be construed to satisfy the judgment only as to past due alimony and support money, it must
at least be held that the stipulation is capable of the construction we have given it. The language is broad enough to be
ambiguous.
18
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In McCaleb v. McCaleb, 177 Cal. 147, 169 Pac. 1023, the
Supreme Court of California said:
"One who is ordered to pay money to another, on pain
of imprisonment if he fails, is entitled to a formal expression by the court of such order, stated clearly
enough to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to
know what he is to do. He should not be obliged to
resort to inferences or implication to ascertain a duty
or obligation of that character."
The Supreme Court of Kansas added its views on the
subject in Ensch v. Ensch, 157 Kan. 107, 138 P. 2d 491. That
court, in- ruling on a contempt commitment on an ambiguous
order, first quoted 17 C. J. S., Contempt, § 12, to the following
effect:
"A decree or order will not be expanded by implication
in contempt proceedings, beyond the meaning of its
terms when read in the light of the purpose for which
the suit was brought, and the facts found must constitute a plain violation of the decree or order so read.
To justify adjudging one guilty of contempt for the
alleged violation of an order, the order must be so
clearly expressed that when applied to the act complained of, it will appear with reasonable certainty
that it has been violated. * * * Nor should a party
be punished for disobedience of an order which is
capable of a construction consistent with his innocence",
and then went on to set aside the judgment of contempt on
the ground that the original order was ambiguous.
In the instant case, the original decree entered in 1941
was clear enough, and we do not question that defendant
knew what was required of him thereunder. But a new order,
or stipulation (the term is not important) was entered in 1949;
19
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and at this time it became necessary to read the decree and the
subsequent order as one. In so reading them there was, at the
very least, some doubt as to what was required of the defendant. He did not-and could not-know for certain whether
he was still under an obligation to pay money to the plaintiff,
nor whether-if so obligated-plaintiff intended to enforce
the decree after the action of February 9th.

5. Where a new order is entered, directing defendant to

do something he was not theretofore bound to do, or clarifying an order that was theretofore ambiguous, the party against
whom the order is directed is entitled to notice of the new
order before he can be found in contempt of court for failure
to obey it.
Consider the situation of the defendant on February 9,
1949. On that day the court entered an order, and the parties
had entered into a stipulation, that the judgment in favor of
the plaintiff was satisfied. At that moment, either ( 1) the
judgment was fully satisfied, both as to past due and future
payments, or (2) it was saitsfied as to past due payments and
there was some doubt as to satisfaction of future payments. If
there had been no order setting aside the stipulation and order,
defendant could not have been found in contempt at that point.
What was the effect of the order of March 7th? Either
it reinstated the decree calling for alimony and support money
payments, or it clarified the situation of February 9th, i.e., it
modified the decree and order to such an extent that defendant
would thereafter know that he was required to make monthly
payments to the plaintiff.
20
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But whichever was the case, something more had. to be
done before defendant could be found in contempt. It was
a condition precedent to contempt that defendant have notice
or knowledge of his duty. There is not even a pretense that
defendant knew of the order of March 7th, or that any notice
of it was served on him or his former counsel. Even if we
ascribe to him notice that the hearing was to be held, he was
still entitled to notice of the action taken at the hearing-or
after it-if he was not present when the order was made, or
if he had no actual knowledge of it. He had neither notice
nor knowledge.
It is well established that a party is entitled to notice of

the entry of an original decree. See 17 C. ]. S., Contempt,

§ 18, and cases cited therein. Also, Phillips v. Superior Court
of Kern County (California), 137 P. 2d 838. The doctrine
has also been enunciated by this Court-in In re Hoover, 44
Utah 476, 141 Pac. 101:
"It must appear that such order, judgment or decree
has been personally served on the one charged, or that
he had notice of the making of such order, or the rendition of such judgment or decree."

There is no difference in principle between an original
decree and a modified or reinstated decree. And this principle
concerns itself with substance rather than form. Whether the
original decree was modified by an order, a supplemental decree, a stipulation, or whatever else; when it is reinstated the
party against whom it is directed must have notice of the
reinstatement or modification-particularly when the decree
as modified requires the party to do something he was not
21
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theretofore bound to do. The question is this: Did the defendant know what was required of him?
6. Notice or knowledge by the defendant of what is required of him must appear either in the proofs taken at the
hearing or in the affidavit supporting the order to show cause.

As was pointed out in Point 5 of this Argument, notice
or knowledge on the part of the defendant must be shown
as a condition precedent to commitment for contempt. And
this notice or knowledge must appear by some form of evidence:
either in the affidavit, or in the testimony and proofs taken
at the contempt hearing.
The Oregon Supreme Court followed this principle in
Hewson v. Hewson, 129 Ore. 612, 277 Pac. 1012, 63 A.L.R.
1216, as follows:
"And the affidavit charging the contempt must aver
that the order has thus been served and the demand
made. See to the same effect Trullinger v. Howe, 58
Or. 73, 113 Pac. 4. In the recent case of State ex rei.
Hambrecht v. Hambrecht, 128 Ore. 305, 274 Pac. 507,
the contemnor's knowledge of the duty was not positively averred, but it was inferred from those recitals
of the affidavit to the effect that he had at one time
complied with the duty. In our present case neither the
so-called affidavit, nor the petition, affords any basis
for such an inference."
Plaintiff's affidavit in this case reads as follows:
"ZOLA SMITH FISHER, formerly ZOLA SMITH,
having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: that on
the 14th day of February, A. D. 1941, this Court made
and entered a decree of divorce, which among other
things granted to her custody of the four minor chil22
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dren of said parties, and awarded to her and ordered
the defendant to pay to her the sum of Fifty ( $50.00)
Dollars each month for the support and maintenance
of said minor children; that since the entry of said
decree defendant has paid to plaintiff nothing except
those sums received involuntarily from defendant and
by the proceedings of this court as indicated by the
files herein; that be has paid nothing since the court
proceedings in February, 1949.
Affiant further states that recently defendant has come
into an inheritance of a considerable amount of money
from his father's estate and he nevertheless has refused
and still refuses to pay anything at all to the support
of said minor children; that defendant is now working,
able bodied and capable of paying this award.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that this Court issue
citation ordering defendant to be and appear before this
(Italics added.)
court * * * " .(R. 119)
In the above affidavit there is no averment that defendant
received any notice of the change in the court's order entered
after the hearing of March. Nor is there any room for inference
that defendant knew of the new order. The affidavit does state
that defendant made some payments under the original decree
-a statement which might be proper basis for an inference
under the Hambrecht case, cited in the opinion, supra-but the
efficacy of this statement as basis for inference is dispelled
when we read the entire affidavit. For the court's attention
was directed to "the files of the case" and to the "Court proceedings in February, 1949." The files of the case, including
the proceedings of the court on February 9th, were then before
it and the court erred if it raised an inference of notice from
reading the entire affidavit. And if it did not raise such an
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inference, there is nothing in the record on which the court
could find that the defendant had notice. See 23 C. ]., Evidence, § 1919, to the effect that the court will judicially notice
the original record in ancillary proceedings, such as proceedings
in contempt. And see 24 L.R.A. ( N .S.) 404.
Thus we observe there was no evidence to support a
finding that the defendant willfully refused to pay money
to the plaintiff, because there is no evidence to show that he
had knowledge of a duty to so pay: ( 1) no averment of notice,
and ( 2) no facts from which- an inference of notice can be
drawn. Nothing brought out at the hearing showed notice
or knowledge-either directly or by implication.

III
FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE, THE
COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
7. In order to support the conclusion that the defendant
is in contempt of court, the court must find that the defendant
knew of the order to pay money, that he refused, and that he
had ability to pay during the period of time in which he
possessed the knowledge of his duty.

After the hearing in the contempt proceeding the trial
court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law:
"That heretofore this Court made and entered its decree of divorce awarding to plaintiff the custody of said
minor children and ordering defendant to pay to plain-

24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tiff for the support of said minor children the sum of
Fifty ( $50.00) Dollars each month.
2.
That heretofore, to wit, on the
day of March,
A. D. 1949, this Court made and entered its decree
and judgment for arrears in said payments in the sum
of $2,635.00.

3.
That during said time defendant has been able to pay
for the support of said children and has received and
has had at least $1540.46, since the 9th day of February, A. D. 1949.

4.
That since said date defendant has willfully failed and
refused to pay anything to plaintiff for the support of
said minor children, although ordered to do so by this
court.
As conclusions of law from the foregoing facts the
Court finds:
CONCLUSIONS. OF LAW
That defendant is guilty of contempt of . Court and
for this contempt defendant be ordered to serve a
period of thirty ( 30) days in the County Jail of Salt
Lake County. * * * "
We respectfully urge the Court that a judgment of contempt, based upon such ambiguous, uncertain, and contradictory findings cannot stand-for there is something more
here than a "minor irregularity." In paragraph 3, the Court
finds that "during said time" defendant has been able to pay;
but in the preceding two paragraphs there is no date certain
which "during said time" refers to. The Court also found
that defendant had money since the 9th day of February which means he had money during at least 21 days in which
25
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he had no obligation to pay. For it will be conceded, we
think, that under no theory was there an obligation' to pay
prior to the first day_ of Marth .. Paragraph 4 states that "since;
said date" the defendant has willfully refused
and. failed
.
. . to
pay. But we have no way of knowing what date the .Court is
referring to.
·. .

'

'

'

.

The specific must control the ·general - and this is particularly true as a rule of construction where there is a conflict
between the two. And although there is here a general finding
that the defendant willfully. refused to pay alimony and support money as ordered by the Court, this general finding is
rendered nugatory by the subsequent findings as to defendant's
ability to pay. Furthermore, there is no finding at all that
the defendant had knowledge of the demands of the decree.
So we find a situation where there ate insufficient facts
to support the findings made; insufficient findings; and other
findings which are so uncertain and ambiguous that they fail
to support the conclusions of law.
We are aware that there is a line of authority indicating
that a Citation a:rid Order to Show Cause is sufficient to constitute notice of the demands of the decree, and of the demand
of the plaintiff that the defendant perform as ordered. But
a Citation issued in August is notice in August. And if the
Court relies upon the Citation _as evidence of notice to the
defendant, there must be evidenc~and a finding-that the
defendant was able to pay as ordered after the citation was
issued. There was no such finding::......,.and there was no evidence
to support such a finding.

26
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IV
THE COURT ERRED IN LOOKING TO THE ENTIRE RECORD TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF
PUNISHMENT TO IMPOSE UPON THE DEFENDANT
FOR CONTEMPT.
8. Civil contempt proceedings are for the purpose of en-

forcing an order of the Court, not for the purpose of imposing
a penalty for past disobedience.
On page 170 of the transcript of proceedings at the hearing appears the following address by the Court:
"As to the amount of punishment the Court will inflict
upon the defendant in the case, the Court now refers
to the file, and the entire file; the Court finds that there
has been a great amount of litigation over the failure
of the defendant to comply with the Decree of the
Court. The Court finds from the record that Judge
B. P. Leverich committed the Defendant for wilful
contempt, failure to comply with the terms of the decree
on December 1, 1941; and again in January, 1949,
defendant was committed to the County Jail by Judge
Baker. * * * "
Following this there are indications that the trial court
sought to reinforce its ideas of social policy by making an example of the defendant. The court looked at the entire record
-except those portions of the record which would excuse or
mitigate the conduct of the defendant. That the court should
not allow prior contempt proceedings to influence it in fixing
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punishment in a given contempt case, and that to take judicial
notice of such prior proceedings is an abuse of discretion and
reversible error, is P?inted out in 1, 7 C.J.S., Contempt,§ 124(e).
Civil contempt proceedings have. been· defined well· and
often as a type of proceeding for enforcing an order. of the
court-usually for the benefit of a party. The purpose of such
a proceeding is coercive; not t(!tributive. And the court should
not allow past contempt proceedings to influence it in fixing
punishment in a current one--unless such past proceedings
convince the court that the more severe sentence will affect
the readiness of the defendant to pay in the case before it.
CONCLUSIONS
The order of February 9th settled the entire judgment in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and the March 1st
order setting it aside was void because entered without notice
to the defendant. This being so, the defendant could not be
committed for contempt because there was no subsisting order
to pay money to the plaintiff.
But even if the stipulation and order was properly set
aside, that is, was not void, defendant was entitled to notice
of the action taken by the court. It was necessary that he be
apprised of his duties before he could willfully refuse to perform them. The findings of fact must show that he had such
notice; and these findings of fact must be supported by evidence.
And, finally, the court abused its discretion and committed
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~

reversible error in taking judicial notice of prior contempt pro-

~·

ceedings.

·~

Upon this argument, and for the reasons appearing therein, we submit that the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed and the defendant ordered discharged.

~4
[~'

Respectfully submitted,
SHIELDS and SHIELDS,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
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